
A Word from the New Chairman

In July 1996, my predecessor signed a seminal document entitled *Joint Vision 2010*. It established a conceptual blueprint for transforming emerging concepts and technologies into joint operational capabilities to deter or defeat threats envisioned for the early 21st century. That vision provided the first overarching joint operational framework for the services and built upon their core competencies, institutional values, and cultures. In advancing towards the same beacon on the not-so-distant horizon of 2010, we have passed several key milestones—with more to come. The next task is to operationalize *JV 2010*—transforming its concepts of joint warfighting into reality.

Operationalizing *JV 2010* is relatively simple. It requires a three-step approach which starts slowly and accelerates as funding and various other pieces fall into place.

The first step will be significant. Perhaps as early as 1999 a joint headquarters element will be identified to monitor CINC and service experiments, battle labs, and other activities while it also conducts small *JV 2010* warfighting experiments. Initial experiments must focus on command and control and operational architecture. The next step will require information superiority experiments to test concepts and capabilities vis-à-vis the information revolution. The final step will include experiments focused on precision engagement, dominant maneuver, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics that will culminate

in 2004 with Global Challenge. This massive experiment will examine all the operational concepts in *JV 2010* and their synergy in achieving full spectrum dominance. The year 2004 will be pivotal because it will set the stage for the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2005 and inform the central decisions that will shape the force of 2010.

I envision several options with regard to joint warfighting experimentation. First, we could use a distributed net, electronically linking many geographically dispersed forces and test ranges. A key tenet of *JV 2010* is the ability to mass effects rather than forces. Why not apply this notion to joint experimentation and use superior data connectivity to move electrons, not people? Second, we could

enlist service and joint battle labs to maximize the benefit of experimentation activities. Finally, to make this work, we must assign the responsibility for joint warfighting experimentation to a specific person, perhaps the commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, who already plays a significant role in joint training and exercises.

Aggressive joint experimentation will be important in properly assessing *JV 2010* concepts and developing capabilities to realize the vision.

I invite the CINCs, services, and major commands to comment on efforts to operationalize *JV 2010*

We are creating roadmaps to assess its operational concepts. This is a team effort involving the entire joint community and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To ensure we are on the right azimuth, we will use warfighters with their operational savvy to

rigorously examine these capabilities in the mud, salt water, air, and space. This is where we must rely on your brain power and support. We need smart operators to provide ideas on joint warfighting experiments, enlarge the debate, and

continue the dialogue on *JV 2010*. We also need support to assess the vision's operational capabilities during upcoming exercises. I therefore invite the CINCs, services, and major commands to comment on efforts to operationalize *JV 2010*—and ask that they keep the joint community posted on warfighting experiments and associated exercises through contributions to future issues of *Joint Force Quarterly*.

Joint experimentation will be the true engine for exploring concepts contained in *JV 2010*. It will examine areas where real breakthroughs will be made in warfare between now and 2010, for discovering those leap-aheads is what *JV 2010* is all about.

Look at the potential breakthrough areas. One operational concept is precision engagement. How will the precision engagement of *JV 2010* differ from the way firepower is employed today? We lose the total effectiveness of both precision weapons and many long range weapons because of inefficiencies in space and time. Ground weapons are assigned to subordinate commanders and there is a delay in bringing them to bear elsewhere on the battlefield even if their range allows. Our 72-hour air tasking order

Embarking Army guns on Navy LCAC, JTF Exercise 98-1.



26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (C.D. Clark)

process is good for prolonged campaigns but is often slow in reacting to changes on the battlefield measured in minutes or hours.

If information technology could provide battlefield commanders with a complete picture of threats and opportunities on the enemy side, we could put many weapons on target in seconds or minutes with available in-range firepower. A joint task force could drastically increase the effects of its weapons and take advantage of quick open-

aggressive JV 2010 experimentation must proceed because it is an investment in our future

ings when instant firepower makes the difference. The rudiments of this revolutionary breakthrough are a common operational picture shared across the battlespace, management tools to facilitate decentralized execution under centralized

oversight, and new doctrine and training. If we can make the necessary changes to pull it off, we can support much faster battle rhythms and attack an enemy in a manner which we can only dream of today. That is what joint experimentation is all about.

We will use simulation, gaming, and field exercises to develop technology and doctrine to achieve breakthroughs and then subject ourselves to rigid assessment to see if they can be done. Joint experimentation will demand original thinking: hooking up dissimilar systems, tying together seemingly incompatible hardware and software, and establishing new processes and procedures. No doubt there will be occasional failures, but that doesn't concern me. Thomas Edison conducted 50,000 experiments to develop a new storage battery. Asked if failures frustrated him, he replied: "What failures? I now know 50,000 things that don't work." Experimentation means the freedom to fail, because it is through such failures that we discover truths which help the next experiment. Thus we will ultimately reap the benefits of a JV 2010-capable force.

We are making plans on a solid foundation. The publication of *Concept for Future Joint Operations* expanded on JV 2010. We also created a sound management process for implementing that vision. The Joint Staff is leading a collaborating endeavor with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CINCs, services, and defense agencies to design and sponsor joint experiments and other assessment events unique to JV 2010. We will also conduct analysis to determine the implications of changes for doctrine, organization, education and training, matériel, leadership, and personnel. Such experiments are more than technological infusions or demonstrations. They permit the study of operational concepts, organizational structure, and doctrine as well as emerging technologies.

We must ensure parallel development in each of these areas to maximize capabilities for future joint commanders to perform complex missions.

Our next product, *Joint Vision 2010 Implementation Master Plan*, will appear in Summer 1998. This document will be a watershed for integrating efforts to assess JV 2010 concepts and operational capabilities. More importantly, it will provide assessment roadmaps for the process of operationalizing JV 2010 concepts.

However, there is a major challenge to operationalizing the vision: Where will the dollars, people, equipment, and time for joint experimentation come from? Both the CINCs and services already have full rucksacks as they work on current and near-term issues. Experimentation could build on current and planned activities by the CINCs, services, and defense agencies, though even leveraging existing experimentation efforts may not suffice. The report by the National Defense Panel identified a need for \$5-10 billion annually for the transformation effort. This money would fund initiatives in joint experimentation, information operations, space, and other areas. The report suggests using offsets realized from another round of base closures and other efficiencies, but the task of finding resources in a zero-sum gain environment is problematic. Regardless, aggressive JV 2010 experimentation must proceed because it is an investment in our future.

This is a stimulating time for the Armed Forces and the Nation. In less than two years we have issued a joint vision, expanded it in *Concept for Future Joint Operations*, devised a process to implement it, and will soon publish *Joint Vision 2010 Implementation Master Plan*. The exciting part and perhaps the most challenging milestone is still ahead: transforming key JV 2010 concepts into capabilities through joint experimentation by warfighters in the field and fleet. I look forward to your innovative ideas and comments on operationalizing this vision.

HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Henry H. Shelton, USA, assumed his position as the fourteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1997.